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ABSTRACT
APPLICATIONS OF PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE
FUNCTIONS ON ASICS AND FPGAS
FEBRUARY 2018
MOHAMMAD A USMANI
B.Tech., ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
M.S.E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Daniel Holcomb
With the ever-increasing demand of security in embedded systems and wireless
sensor networks, we require integrating security primitives for authentication in these
devices. One such primitive is known as a Physically Unclonable Function. This
entity can be used to provide security at a low cost, as the key or digital signature
can be generated by dedicating a small part of the silicon die to these primitives
which produces a fingerprint unique to each device. This fingerprint produced by a
PUF is called its response. The response of PUFs depends upon the process variation
that occurs during the manufacturing process. In embedded systems and especially
wireless sensor networks, there is a need to secure the data the collected from the
sensors.
To tackle this problem, we propose the use of SRAM-based PUFs to detect the
temperature of the system. This is done by taking the PUF response to generate
temperature based keys. The key would act as proofs of temperature of the system.
v
In SRAM PUFs, it is experimentally determined that at varying temperatures there
is a shift in the response of the cells from zero to one and vice-versa. This variation
can be exploited to generate random but repeatable keys at different temperatures.
To evaluate our approach, we first analyze the key metrics of a PUF, namely, re-
liability and uniqueness. In order to test the idea of using the PUF as a temperature
based key generator, we collect data from a total of ten SRAM chips at fixed tem-
peratures steps. We first calculate the reliability, which is related to bit error rate,
an important parameter with respect to error correction, at various temperatures to
verify the stability of the responses. We then identify the temperature of the system
by using a temperature sensor and then encode the key offset by PUF response at
that temperature using BCH codes. This key-temperature pair can then be used
to establish secure communication between the nodes. Thus, this scheme helps in
establishing secure keys as the generation has an extra variable to produce confusion.
We developed a novel PUF for Xilinx FPGAs and evaluated its quality metrics. It
is very compact and has high uniqueness and reliability. We also implement 2 different
PUF configurations to allow per-device selection of best PUFs to reduce the area and
power required for key-generation. We also evaluate the temperature response of this
PUF and show improvement in the response by using per-device selection.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Trends
Today the Internet of Things (IoT) and wireless sensor networks(WSNs) are used
for an increasingly large number of applications which require security. Security
measures are needed to prevent malicious access to the system or the network to
prevent tampering of data and functionality. One such security measure can be
implemented by using an encryption scheme. To implement an encryption scheme,
each sensor node or device needs to have its own key. PUF can be used to generate
secure cryptographic keys [30]. PUF-based keys are unique to each device as they stem
from the process variations inherent in the silicon at the time of fabrication. The work
proposed in this thesis develops a PUF based secure temperature sensor using the
power-up state of SRAM cells. The idea for a secondary temperature sensor builds on
the idea of a temperature-based virtual proof [34]. This temperature sensor can then
be used in a key exchange scenario between two nodes since the power-up response of
the SRAMs varies with temperature. The first node will report its temperature and
send over a message with the key generated from the SRAM PUF at that temperature.
The other node will already know the key at that specific temperature and will be
able to decrypt the message. We will also explore the implementation of this scheme
on FPGAs. We will develop a new type of PUF specific to the FPGAs. The following
are the main areas of work:
1
• We have tested the SRAM PUF on an 8Kx8 SRAM chip AS6C6264 fabricated in
0.35µm technology and generate results for a temperature range of 0-55 degree
celsius with a fixed step size.
• We then generate the plots for within temperature and between temperature
Hamming distances to test how finely we can distinguish the temperatures.
• We have tested the scheme using advanced technology SRAM cells fabricated
in 160 nm and 90 nm.
• We implemented a new type of PUF on a FPGA platform using design derived
from [3]. The new design is implemented on SLICE-L cells. This will help us
in restricting a block on FPGA dedicated to encryption and key generation.
• We propose and evaluate a per-device PUF configuration selection scheme on
FPGA to save the cost of error correction and key generation and also improve
temperature response.
1.2 Thesis overview
PUFs are primitives used in applications that demand high security. These are
efficient to implement and require a small area overhead. In this thesis, we propose
two different works done on PUFs.
First is a secure temperature based key generation scheme using the SRAM Phys-
ically Unclonable Function. Applications requiring highly secure key generation can
leverage the change in response of the SRAM PUF with temperature to develop a
tamper-proof communication system. In this thesis, we will focus on the development
of a system for a secure key generation scheme based on temperature.
Fig. 1.1 shows the basic system. It consists of master and slave nodes commu-
nicating over an insecure link. The ambient temperature on the slave node can be
verified based on the key generated for the encryption of its message. The reported
2
Figure 1.1: Proposed system
Figure 1.2: Figure showing the restriction of resources on an FPGA chip for
reconfigurable PUF selection and making the rest of the design independent
temperature from the slave will be used to decrypt the message. If the decrypted
message is invalid, we will know there is something wrong with the node, and it is
trying to fake its temperature.
We will study the sensitivity of the SRAM PUF response to temperature to deter-
mine the minimum distinguishable change in temperature. The effects of temperature
on the behavior of SRAM cells will be taken into account during the development of
the system.
The second work proposed in this thesis is a novel implementation of Anderson’s
PUF implemented on Xilinx FPGAs. This implementation can be instantiated any-
where on the chip, unlike the original design which had specific design requirements.
One advantage of this implementation is that we can restrict the block for encryption
anywhere on the chip as shown in Fig. 1.2. This PUF can be instantiated in two
different configurations at each location. We explore the advantage of selecting, on a
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per-device basis, the best of the two PUF configuration for a reduction in overall bit
error rate. We discuss the CAD flow for the per-device configuration and also present
the area savings achieved using this approach. Lastly, we present the temperature
response of the PUF showing its robustness across a wide range of temperatures and
improvement in BER across temperatures gained by using the proposed approach of
per-device configuration of PUFs.
1.3 Thesis outline
Chapter 2 reviews different types of PUFs that have been developed and imple-
mented in ASICs and FPGAs. Chapter 3 covers the design of the SRAM PUF used in
this work including detailed analysis about the uniqueness and reliability of SRAM
PUFs is covered. Chapter 4 focuses on the core idea behind the use of PUF as a
temperature sensor and generating temperature based keys. The advantages of using
SRAM along with a temperature sensor for key establishment are discussed.
A novel PUF implementation on Xilinx FPGAs is discussed in chapter 5. We also
discuss a per-device PUF selection scheme to improve the reliability of the PUFs and
gain savings in the area.
4
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) are primitives that produce unique chip
specific signatures dynamically by exploiting the process variations inherent in the
silicon during fabrication. PUFs can be classified into two types, namely strong PUF,
and weak PUFs [35]. The strong PUFs can generate multiple random but repeatable
responses by accepting challenges as input and mapping each challenge to a corre-
sponding response in a way that is unique to each challenge. Weak PUFs, on the other
hand, generate a single response. Both the types of PUFs have been implemented
in ASICs and FPGAs. In this chapter, background of the various different types of
PUFs is presented, more specifically the Arbiter PUF [11], the Ring Oscillator PUF
[7], the Butterfly PUF [24], and the sensor based PUF [33, 43]. A comparison of
various PUFs have been discussed in [21].
Figure 2.1: Arbiter PUF [11]
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2.1 Arbiter PUF
The arbiter PUF[11, 26, 39, 4] is based on the delay of a parallel chain of multiple
stages of multiplexers which feed a Flip-Flop. This PUF exploits the difference in
the delay of the multiplexer paths. Figure 2.1 shows an arbiter PUF, with two
parallel N-stage multiplexer chains feeding a flip-flop. A step signal is applied to
the input and the step propagates through the paths of the multiplexer stages. The
N-bit (S[0],...,S[N-1]) challenge is fed to the select line input of the multiplexers.
Depending on the value of S[i] the signal will propagate through the upper path or
the lower through stage i of the multiplexer chain. One path goes to the clock input
and other to data input. If the step signal to data input reaches first, then a 1 is
latched in the Flip-Flop otherwise, if the step signal reaches the clock input first, a
0 is latched. The arbiter-based PUF brings low resource overhead, but its structure
makes it hard to map the multiplexer on matched paths on FPGA. This PUF is an
example of strong PUF as there are various possible challenges that can be fed by
the user to get different responses.
2.2 Ring Oscillator PUF
The Ring Oscillator PUF (ROPUF) PUF uses multiple oscillators which feed the
counters. Figure 2.2 depicts the basic PUF circuit having two oscillators. For this
circuit to work as a PUF it is required that the two oscillators have the identical
implementation on silicon so that the delay difference is only due to the process
variations. Each ring oscillator oscillates with a frequency that deviates slightly from
the design value based on process variations. The output of the two oscillators is fed
to two separate counters and after a certain period of counting the output of the two
counters is compared to produce a 0 or a 1 PUF response bit. A RO-based PUF can
have multiple ring oscillators before the counter, as shown in figure 2.3 which may
be preselected or a multiplexer may be used before the counter allowing the user to
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Figure 2.2: Basic Ring Oscillator PUF
Figure 2.3: Ring Oscillator PUF using multiple ring oscillators and a counter [41]
form challenge-response pairs. In this way, this weak PUF is converted into a strong
PUF by allowing the user to select the multiplexer select line bits.
2.3 Butterfly PUF
The Butterfly PUF [24] is a type of PUF targeted toward FPGAs. It consists
of a pair of cross-coupled latches which tries to mimic the startup behavior of cross-
coupled inverters in a SRAM cell. The Butterfly PUF (BPUF) circuit is shown in
Figure 2.4. These latches contain both preset and clear signals, both of which are
asynchronous. The response of the PUF is generated by sending an excitation signal
that triggers the preset signal of one latch and the clear signal of the other, which
makes the BPUF circuit enter an unstable state. The circuit is then allowed to
settle to one of the two stable states that are possible. When the excitation signal
is made low after a few clock cycles, the BPUF starts to attain a stable state. This
state depends on the delay differential of the interconnects which are designed using
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Figure 2.4: Butterfly PUF [24]
Figure 2.5: Sensor based PUF [33]
symmetrical paths on the FPGA matrix [24]. This PUF is an example of weak PUF
as no challenge-response pairs are available.
2.4 Sensor based PUF
The sensor-based PUFs are a more recent type of PUFs. These PUFs use pre-
existing sensors in the device to generate a random key. Figure 2.5 shows the basic
structure of a sensor based PUF. The sensor can be any transducer that can sense
ambient physical quantity. The PUF can be either weak or strong depending on
whether it can accept a challenge or not. Depending on the physical quantity, which
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Figure 2.6: Basic bistable ring
Figure 2.7: Bistable Ring PUF[5]
can be temperature, pressure, light intensity or any other quantity, the PUF response
varies. In one prior work [43], a MEMs based PUF using a Gyroscope sensor is
developed. The PUF is for key generation using helper data [9] stored within the
ASIC chip.
2.5 Bistable Ring PUF
This is another type of PUF which is very similar in structure to ring oscillator
PUF, but instead of having odd elements in the chain this PUF has an even number
of inverting elements, making it bistable. Fig. 2.6 shows a logical view of Bistable
ring PUF [5, 46, 6].
To make the PUF a strong PUF and to make it resettable, the structure shown in
Fig. 2.7 is used. The PUF consists of n blocks. Each block contains 2 NOR gates, one
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multiplexer, and one demultiplexer. The NOR gates act like inverters when reset is
low, otherwise when reset is high the output of each gate is set to zero. The challenge
bits C[0] to C[n-1] are applied to the select lines of multiplexers and demultiplexers
as shown in the figure. The elements of the chain are thus selected according to
the applied challenge C. Based on the strength variations of the NORs, a 0 or 1 is
produced at the output.
2.6 Anderson PUF
The above-discussed PUF designs are not targeted specifically for FPGA imple-
mentation and are rather targeted towards custom IC implementation. These designs
pose problems when implemented on FPGA. One problem that comes in for the PUFs
discussed above is that they require the logic and routing to be identical along the
delay paths, which guarantees that the delay arising in the output is solely due to the
process variations and not due to logic or routing bias. Implementing identical delay
paths is rather complicated in FPGA and requires the use of hard macros, which in-
corporate fixed placement and routing. The use of hard macros complicate the design
and requires manual labor from the designer. The designer has to manually balance
the path delays to make these instances work as PUFs. Manual routing is tedious and
is subject to errors. Furthermore, hard-coded macros may result in routing that may
obstruct other design signals in the routing stage of the flow, potentially increasing
design congestion and reducing circuit performance. Finally, the prior PUF designs
consume considerable silicon area per PUF bit. Anderson PUF[3] deals with these
issues elegantly and requires the designer to only work at the behavioral level.
The basic circuit of the Anderson PUF is shown in 2.8. This is a novel PUF that
doesn’t require the use of hard macros. The design is done purely at the behavioral
level. This PUF uses SLICEM cells in Xilinx FPGA in which there are components
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Figure 2.8: Anderson’s PUF on Xilinx FPGA[3]
that can be used as LUT for combinational logic or as shift registers for memory. The
length of the shift register in one instance is 16-bit.
In this PUF, the shift registers (shown in grey) are initially loaded with comple-
mented alternating 0-1 values and then the outputs of these shift registers are fed to
the select lines of the multiplexers (shown in green) in the carry chain. The transitions
at the input of the select line of the multiplexer can cause a glitch to be produced at
the end of the carry chain. The width of the glitch is proportional to the delay of the
carry chain. If the glitch is small it is filtered out in the routing wire, otherwise, it
reaches the asynchronous preset of the flip-flop (shown in blue) and sets the output
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of the flip-flop to logic 1. The output of this flip-flop is taken as the output response
of the PUF. This implementation of Anderson PUF requires shift registers and can
only be implemented in SLICEM cells of the FPGA chip.
2.7 Challenges associated with PUFs
While both strong and weak PUFs can be used for authentication purposes,
both come with their disadvantages. The strong PUFs are susceptible to model-
ing attacks using machine learning algorithms. This is because of a large pool of
challenge-response pairs available to perform training. Attacks against strong have
been performed and shown to predict the response of the PUF with very high accu-
racy [36, 18, 37]. Weak PUFs, on the other hand, have very limited set of challenge-
response pairs or in extreme cases just one. They are not susceptible to modeling
attacks because the response of the weak PUF is kept secret throughout its lifetime.
Thus to use these PUFs we need to store helper data in the system to generate keys
to perform error correction and key generation. This is discussed in detail in chapter
6. The risks of using PUFs have been discussed further in [22].
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CHAPTER 3
STATIC RANDOM ACCESS MEMORY BASED
PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTION
This chapter explains the use SRAM cells as PUFs. The SRAM PUF [14] [12]
utilises the conventional SRAM cell to generate its response. The SRAM PUF is a
weak PUF when it’s power-up response is used as a fingerprint. We can modify this
PUF to function act as a strong PUF as discussed in [16]. We present our analysis
of the PUF in terms of reliability and uniqueness using the 8Kx8 bit SRAM chip
AS6C6264.
3.1 SRAM design
The SRAM cell usually consists of six transistors, four of which are used in making
a cross-coupled inverter for regenerative feedback. The two transistors M1 and M3,
shown in fig. 3.1, are called the access transistors and connect the inverters to the bit-
lines for writing or reading to the cell. The access transistors are controlled through
the word line. The word line selects the word which has to read or written according
to the operation needed. Before the read or write operation, the bit-lines BL and BL
are precharged. In the case of a read operation, the following steps are performed:
1. The precharge and equalization circuit is activated by raising the precharge clock
high. This causes the BL and BL to rise to to a certain precharge voltage.
2. The word to be read out is selected by turning on its word line WL. The data
stored in the cell causes a differential in the voltage levels of the two-bit lines
according to the value stored on it.
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3. Once an adequate difference is generated, the sense amplifier is turned on by
turning on the transistors M1 and M2. The small difference in the input on
the two inverters is amplified due to regenerative feedback and the bit lines are
pulled to VDD or ground respectively.
The write operation is done similarly by performing the following steps:
1. The inputs are applied to the bit lines through a strong driver. To write a 1 in
the cell, a 1 is applied to BL and 0 to BL.
2. The word to be written selected by turning on its word line WL. The input of
the cell inverters gets pulled up or down by the bit lines.
3. Due to the regenerative feedback of the cross-coupled inverters, the value is
quickly settled to the values at the bit lines.
3.2 SRAM PUF operation
The basic six transistor SRAM cell is shown in figure 3.2. It consists of two cross
coupled CMOS inverters along with two NMOS access transisitor. Each cell can
store 1 bit of information. The initial state of the SRAM cell after powerup can be
used as PUF to generate random and unique signatures. The response of the SRAM
cell depends upon the relative strengths of the two cross coupled CMOS inverters.
Initially, when no power is applied, the output of both the inverters Q and Q¯ is a 0.
When power is applied, the transistors turn on and try to pull up their outputs to a
high value. This creates metastability in the cell as the inverters are cross coupled.
The regenerative feedback of the inverters accelerates the settling of the response of
the cell. The stronger pull-up in the cell settles to a output of 1 while a stronger pull
down settles to a 0. The affinity of the cell to settle to 1 or a zero response is termed
as its skew.
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Figure 3.1: SRAM chip circuitry [38]
The skew of a cell is subject to both the process variations and the noise at
start-up. The power-up state of the cell is directly dependent on the skew of the
cell. Skew at a given power-up is influenced by noise, so the skew of each cell across
many power-ups is described by a probability distribution function (Fig. 3.3). A
skewed cell (Fig. 3.3b) always powers up to a 0 or 1 depending upon the direction of
the skew and is the effect of noise is not enough to flip the response. On the other
hand, a non-skewed or neutral-skewed cell (Fig. 3.3a) can power up to either 0 or
1, depending on the noise conditions. Although a non-skewed cell would seem to be
composed of matched devices, this may not be always the case, but rather different
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Figure 3.2: SRAM cell [15]
(a) Unskewed SRAM cell (b) 0-skewed SRAM cell
Figure 3.3: Figure showing effect of process variations and noise on SRAM cell
process variations canceling out each other to create a non-skewed behavior. This
behavior, therefore, might vary as the operating conditions are varied [15, 17].
3.3 SRAM chip architecture
Three different chips are used in our experiments. The specifications of these chips
are tabulated in table 3.1. The architecture of one of the chip (AS6C6264) is shown
in figure 3.4. The chip has a capacity of 8Kbytes, each word being 8-bit wide. The
Chip has a parallel interface for addressing the words. The decoder selects one of the
word lines based on the address provided to be read or written in the chip array. The
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Table 3.1: SRAM chips under evaluation
IC Manufacturer Capacity Fabrication technology Interface
AS6C6264 Alliance memory 8 KB 350 nm Parallel
23LC1024 Microchip 128 KB 160 nm Serial SPI
CY7C185 Cypress Semiconductor 8 KB 90 nm Parallel
control circuitry block controls the operation to be performed on the chip. The I/O
data circuit is a bidirectional bus which can output the data from the cell as well as
take the data from the outside driver for writing inside the chip.
Figure 3.4: AS6C6264 SRAM chip details[2]
The other chips also have similar architectures. Readers are referred to [31] and
[8] for details.
3.4 Experimental validation
A primary research goal is to determine if the SRAM PUF can be used to generate
temperature specific keys. The PUF performance has to be measured at different
temperatures to quantify the change in response. The PUF performance is defined
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by two primary factors, uniqueness (Within class Hamming distance) and reliability
(Between class Hamming distance).
For our analysis, we evaluated the power-up response of the three SRAM chips.
Chips AS6C6264 and CY7C185 have 8K locations each having a word size of 8-bit.
Hence, a total of 65536-bits can be generated. For chip 23LC1024, we have 1Mbit
of PUFs. We evaluated the three different chips. In this section, we describe the
experiments used to analyze these parameters. We quantify the two properties of the
PUFs by dividing all the PUF instances into blocks of 128 PUFs bits across the chip
for all the three chips and their instances. In total, we have 512 disjoint 128-bit PUFs
on chips AS6C6264 and CY7C185 and 8192 disjoint 128-bit PUFs on chip 23LC1024.
3.4.1 Uniqueness
PUFs are used generate device-specific fingerprints. To identify each device uniquely,
each instance of the PUF must produce a response that is independent and differ-
ent from the response of the other PUF instances. To measure the randomness of
responses across instance we calculate the uniqueness parameter for the PUF. The
uniqueness is calculated by computing the Hamming distance between the response
of the two PUF instances [10]. The Hamming distance for any two n-bit output
responses Oa and Ob is calculated using equation 3.1.
HD(Oa, Ob) =
n−1∑
i=0
(Oa[i]
⊕
Ob[i]) (3.1)
To calculate the uniqueness or Between class Hamming distance we use eq. 3.2.
The ideal uniqueness for any PUF is 50%, meaning that half the bits of the response
are always different.
BHD(i, j) =
1
k∗(k−1)
2
k−1∑
a=0
k−1∑
b=0
HD(Oi,a, Oj,b) (3.2)
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Here i and j are the n-bit PUFs under comparison and k is the number of trials.
Oi,a represents the output response of PUF instance i in a
th trial. Since we consider
128-bit outputs, the ideal between class Hamming distance in our case is 64 bits.
3.4.2 Reliability
For PUFs to act as device authentication entities or to generate keys, their re-
sponses must be repeatable over evaluations. To measure the repeatability of the re-
sponses of a PUF instance, we calculate its Within class Hamming distance. Within
class hamming distance measures the Hamming distance between two trials of the
same PUF. The ideal value of within class Hamming distance is 0, meaning that the
responses are perfectly repeatable. Due to noise and variation in operating conditions,
this ideal value is not achievable. The equation for calculating the average Within
class Hamming distance given by eq. 3.3.
WHD =
1
(k−1)∗(k−2)
2
k−1∑
i=0
k−1∑
j=i+1
HD(Oi, Oj) (3.3)
Here n is the length of the response, k is the trial number and Oi represents the
response of the PUF in the ith trial. This equation calculates the Hamming distance
of all possible combinations of the trials of the PUF.
3.5 Results and analysis
The between class Hamming distance obtained by comparing two 128 bit PUFs
in the same locations from random chips and randomly selected output trials. Over
1000,000 comparisons the between class Hamming distance is shown in red in Figures
3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 for the 3 chips under evaluation. The within class Hamming distance
measuring the reliability of the 128-bit PUF instances is shown in blue in figures 3.5,
3.6 and 3.7. The results of these experiments are tabulated in table 3.2. From these
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Table 3.2: PUF reliability and uniqueness for 3 different SRAM chips evaluated using
128-bit PUF blocks
IC Within class Hamming distance Between class Hamming distance
AS6C6264 4.24 bits (3.38%) 63.02 bits (49.22%)
23LC1024 9.33 bits (7.28%) 53.05 bits (41.44%)
CY7C185 11.44 bit (8.90%) 57.72 bits (45.10%)
results, we can conclude that the PUFs produces a unique outputs. Also, the PUFs
have low within class Hamming distance showing that the PUFs are reliable.
Figure 3.5: Between and within class Hamming distances for 128 bit PUFs from
AS6C6264 chips
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Figure 3.6: Between and within class Hamming distances for 128 bit PUFs from
23LC1024 chips
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Figure 3.7: Between and within class Hamming distances for 128 bit PUFs from
CY7C185 chips
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CHAPTER 4
PUF BASED KEYS AS PROOFS OF TEMPERATURE
In this Chapter, we first give a detailed description of the methodology for data
collection and the data collection system. We then propose the idea of using SRAM
PUFs along with the temperature of the environment as a means to establish key
between two communicating nodes. We provide evidence to support our approach by
calculating the uniqueness of the PUFs on all the locations of a chip and observing
the shift in between temperature Hamming distance of the PUFs with respect to a
minimum temperature of 0◦C. Also, we discuss the error correcting codes that will be
used in our work along with a full system design to generate and establish temperature
based key by utilising temperature sensor along with temperature dependent bits
generated by the PUF corrected by the error correcting codes.
4.1 Main objective
The objective of this research is to use PUFs to generate keys which change with
temperature with fixed step size. The response of the PUFs changes with tempera-
tures. If the distance between the responses at two different consecutive temperatures
is higher than the within class (temperature) hamming distances at those tempera-
tures, then we can exploit this variation to generate temperature dependent keys. We
will have to explore the minimum temperature difference between responses that gen-
erates a Hamming distance greater than the within temperature Hamming distance.
This is important because if the Hamming distance of the PUF responses between two
temperatures is not big enough, a noisy trial from one temperature can be considered
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as the PUF output from a different temperature. Once we find a temperature step
size that produces sufficiently large between temperature Hamming distances, we can
use it to generate keys unique to those temperature steps.
Since the key for a particular temperature step is unique and can only be generated
when the ambient temperature of the system in the range of that temperature step,
these unique keys can be used as an indicator of temperature. Thus a temperature
sensor is created that cannot be forged.
4.2 Data Collection
4.2.1 Data remanence
To collect multiple powerup responses from the SRAMs, we need to evaluate
the maximum retention time at lowest temperature (0◦C) under evaluation. This is
needed to make sure that the old values from the SRAMs are erased before evaluating
a new trial. Memories are devices that store the state in the form of charges. These
charges are lost due to leakages in the devices causing the data to be lost when power is
turned off. At low temperatures, the leakages are reduced exponentially. The leakage
current in an MOS device is directly proportional to the temperature as shown in the
equation 4.1. Due to the reduced leakage current, the time required for the discharge
of state increases exponentially. Due to this phenomenon, the memories are subject
to cold boot attacks[13]. Some other attacks and prevention methods are discussed
in [48] and [32].
The subthreshold leakages are given by equation
Isubthreshold = As
W
L
v2T (1− e
−VDS
vT )e
VGS−Vth
nvT (4.1)
• where As is a technology-dependent constant,
• Vth is the threshold voltage,
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Figure 4.1: Data remanence duration after power down at different temperatures
• L and W are the device effective channel length and width,
• VGS is the gate-to-source voltage,
• n is the subthreshold swing coefficient for the transistor,
• VDS is the drain-to-source voltage, and
• vT is the thermal voltage.
According to equation 4.1, the leakage and temperature have quadratic relationship.
To test the data retention of our SRAM chip, the following steps were performed:
1. The SRAM chip is soaked at the desired temperature in the heat chamber for
7 minutes.
2. A microcontroller writes in zeroes in all the cells of the SRAM chip.
3. The power line of the chip is grounded and then the data is read out after a
specified delay.
4. Delay is incremented by 20ms and experiment is repeated from step 2 until the
Hamming weight stops increasing further.
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Figure 4.2: System for data collection at different temperatures
Following the approach discussed above, we generated the retention times for two
temperatures as shown in figure 4.2.1. It can be observed that at 0 degrees the
retention time is much higher that at 25 degrees. To collect the response at different
temperatures from the SRAM chip, we have to abide by the minimum power off
duration found from the curve, so that the previous power-up state is completely
erased from the chip.
4.2.2 Data-collection setup
Figure 4.2 shows the basic setup used to extract data off the SRAM at different
temperatures. We collect the data over a range of 0◦C to 55◦C. The following steps
are performed to generate 100 trials from a single chip at a single temperature:
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1. The PC runs a python script which communicates with the heat chamber over
ethernet to control the temperature. The script sets the initial temperature to
0oC.
2. The system waits for 7 minutes of soak time to make sure that the chip is at
the same temperature as the ambience.
3. After completion of soak time, a command is sent to the TI MSP430 microcon-
troller to begin reading the data from the SRAM chip.
4. The Microcontroller collects 100 trials by powering the chip on and off using
BJTs. The power off time is dictated by remanence time as discussed in section
4.2.1. It then sends the data read over through serial RS-232 link to the PC
which gets logged in a file.
5. The temperature is increased by a step of 5◦C process is repeated until 55◦C is
reached.
4.2.3 Temperature response of SRAM
In this section, we present our temperature results generated from the AS6C6264
SRAM chip. Figures 4.3 show the variation in the response of the SRAM PUF at
different temperatures. The Hamming distances are calculated by setting the 0oC
response as the base response. This figure clearly shows a positive drift in the Ham-
ming distances as the temperature is increased. To allow for easy distinction of
temperatures, majority voting is performed on the data and Hamming distances are
recalculated. We can clearly see distinct histograms for different temperatures.Tables
4.1 and 4.2 tabulates the between Hamming distances for chip 1 between all tem-
perature pairs. We see the same pattern of increasing distance from temperature
increases. Also, in table 4.2 we see an increase in within temperature distance, which
makes it easier to distinguish between two temperatures. We only include one more
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Figure 4.3: BER of PUF instances placed on AS6C6264 chip 1 across different
temperatures
chips data (Figure 4.4) to show that this phenomenon is general and is applicable for
all chips, though it occurs for all the 10 chips under evaluation.
4.2.4 Testing on advanced technology SRAM
In this section we present the results taken from two advanced technology SRAM
chips. The first one is a Microchip 23LC1024 [31] which is a 128KB SRAM chip
with SPI interface fabricated in 160nm technology.The second is a Cypress CY7C185
[8] which is an 8KB SRAM chip with parallel I/O and is fabricated in 90nm tech-
nology. We performed the temperature data collection and analysis experiments to
test whether this technique is feasible with newer technology SRAM cells. All the
results are generated from 8KB responses (65536-bits responses). Figures 4.5 and 4.6
show the temperature responses of 2 chips respectively. It is clear that the response
follows a similar trend as the results from the 350nm SRAM chip described in sec
4.2.3. Tables 4.3 and 4.5 show the change in Hamming distance with temperatures
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Figure 4.4: BER of PUF instances placed on AS6C6264 chip 2 across different
temperatures
Table 4.1: Between temperature average Hamming distances observed on 1 chip
Temp(C) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
0 4.13 - - - - - - - - - - -
5 4.37 4.20 - - - - - - - - - -
10 4.86 4.44 4.27 - - - - - - - - -
15 5.33 4.80 4.45 4.34 - - - - - - - -
20 5.78 5.21 4.79 4.53 4.42 - - - - - - -
25 6.23 5.66 5.20 4.87 4.62 4.51 - - - - - -
30 6.72 6.16 5.69 5.31 4.97 4.70 4.59 - - - - -
35 7.22 6.70 6.24 5.83 5.45 5.09 4.79 4.66 - - - -
40 7.77 7.29 6.86 6.43 6.02 5.60 5.20 4.87 4.75 - - -
45 8.38 7.96 7.56 7.13 6.70 6.23 5.75 5.30 4.99 4.83 - -
50 9.10 8.74 8.38 7.97 7.52 7.02 6.48 5.93 5.48 5.08 4.89 -
55 9.70 9.39 9.07 8.66 8.22 7.70 7.12 6.52 5.99 5.46 5.06 4.90
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Table 4.2: Between temperature average Hamming distances observed on 1 chip after
Majority voting
Temp(C) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
0 1.72 - - - - - - - - - - -
5 2.15 1.76 - - - - - - - - - -
10 2.90 2.14 1.74 - - - - - - - - -
15 3.57 2.73 2.07 1.85 - - - - - - - -
20 4.13 3.26 2.55 2.12 1.82 - - - - - - -
25 4.69 3.85 3.13 2.61 2.12 1.82 - - - - - -
30 5.26 4.49 3.81 3.25 2.68 2.15 1.88 - - - - -
35 5.85 5.16 4.53 3.97 3.37 2.75 2.21 1.89 - - - -
40 6.44 5.84 5.28 4.74 4.15 3.48 2.84 2.24 1.98 - - -
45 7.17 6.67 6.18 5.67 5.10 4.42 3.71 2.99 2.44 2.10 - -
50 7.95 7.56 7.15 6.68 6.14 5.46 4.73 3.92 3.22 2.50 2.05 -
55 8.63 8.30 7.94 7.51 6.99 6.33 5.59 4.77 4.00 3.13 2.35 2.01
for both the chips respectively. Tables 4.4 and 4.6 shows the values after 9-majority
voting for the 2 chips.
4.2.5 Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity is a measure of the percentage change in the Within class Hamming
distance per degree Celsius. The sensitivity is calculated using the equation 4.2.
Here, Tn and Tn+1 represents the responses of the PUF at temperature step n and
n+1 respectively. In our case, the step size in 5◦C. The sensitivity of the Within class
Hamming distance with respect to temperature for 3 different technology SRAM cells
is shown in figure 4.7. We can see that for all the SRAMs the sensitivity is pretty
consistent across temperatures and stay in the range of 0.6% and 2.0%.
Sensitivity(Tn+1, Tn) =
BHD(Tn+1, Tn)−WHD(Tn)
WHD(Tn) ∗ step (4.2)
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Figure 4.5: BER of PUF instances placed on chip 23LC1024 across different
temperatures
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Figure 4.6: BER of PUF instances placed on chip CY7C185 across different
temperatures
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Table 4.3: Between temperature average Hamming distances observed on an 160nm
23LC1024 chip
Temp(C) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
0 6.807 - - - - - - - - - - -
5 7.268 6.901 - - - - - - - - - -
10 7.564 7.270 7.080 - - - - - - - - -
15 8.015 7.736 7.582 7.196 - - - - - - - -
20 8.472 8.110 7.855 7.517 7.330 - - - - - - -
25 9.069 8.652 8.322 7.964 7.773 7.282 - - - - - -
30 9.649 9.198 8.813 8.420 8.159 7.851 7.602 - - - - -
35 10.436 9.961 9.524 9.086 8.752 8.402 8.140 7.554 - - - -
40 10.998 10.495 10.028 9.542 9.154 8.728 8.400 7.909 7.609 - - -
45 11.807 11.295 10.795 10.284 9.860 9.373 8.998 8.509 8.255 7.588 - -
50 12.556 12.026 11.527 11.002 10.542 10.027 9.610 9.094 8.787 8.335 7.537 -
55 13.102 12.558 12.033 11.496 11.005 10.454 9.987 9.412 9.043 8.508 7.826 7.563
Table 4.4: Between temperature average Hamming distances observed on 160nm
23LC1024 chip after Majority voting
Temp(C) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
0 3.08 - - - - - - - - - - -
5 3.78 3.16 - - - - - - - - - -
10 4.26 3.66 3.29 - - - - - - - - -
15 4.96 4.40 4.00 3.30 - - - - - - - -
20 5.63 4.98 4.45 3.76 3.40 - - - - - - -
25 6.53 5.85 5.23 4.53 4.10 3.17 - - - - - -
30 7.33 6.63 5.98 5.27 4.74 4.12 3.62 - - - - -
35 8.34 7.69 7.02 6.30 5.71 5.07 4.50 3.50 - - - -
40 9.06 8.39 7.72 6.98 6.35 5.61 4.97 4.07 3.54 - - -
45 10.08 9.42 8.76 8.03 7.39 6.63 5.97 5.13 4.64 3.55 - -
50 10.98 10.33 9.69 8.99 8.34 7.56 6.91 6.09 5.56 4.84 3.48 -
55 11.68 11.02 10.36 9.65 8.99 8.20 7.51 6.61 6.00 5.15 3.98 3.51
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Table 4.5: Between temperature average Hamming distances observed on a 90nm
CY7C185 chip
Temp 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
5 8.99 - - - - - - - - - -
10 9.56 8.85 - - - - - - - - -
15 9.89 9.20 8.79 - - - - - - - -
20 10.24 9.60 9.13 8.68 - - - - - - -
25 10.72 10.12 9.70 9.20 8.94 - - - - - -
30 11.74 11.13 10.66 10.16 9.61 7.97 - - - - -
35 12.15 11.56 11.09 10.60 10.05 8.35 7.82 - - - -
40 12.56 12.01 11.54 11.05 10.51 8.88 8.31 7.96 - - -
45 13.11 12.62 12.17 11.69 11.17 9.62 9.11 8.56 8.02 - -
50 13.71 13.24 12.79 12.33 11.82 10.30 9.80 9.26 8.58 8.11 -
55 14.73 14.30 13.89 13.45 12.99 11.58 11.10 10.57 9.95 9.35 8.44
Table 4.6: Between temperature average Hamming distances observed on a 90nm
CY7C185 chip after Majority voting
Temp(C) 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
5 4.06 - - - - - - - - - -
10 5.20 3.96 - - - - - - - - -
15 5.84 4.68 4.04 - - - - - - - -
20 6.44 5.45 4.69 3.93 - - - - - - -
25 7.21 6.28 5.65 4.85 4.37 - - - - - -
30 8.92 8.04 7.40 6.68 5.81 3.78 - - - - -
35 9.52 8.74 8.08 7.42 6.59 4.49 3.68 - - - -
40 10.10 9.36 8.74 8.05 7.29 5.34 4.48 3.91 - - -
45 10.71 10.09 9.49 8.84 8.13 6.30 5.65 4.78 3.83 - -
50 11.43 10.83 10.25 9.65 8.96 7.24 6.63 5.86 4.76 3.93 -
55 12.68 12.16 11.65 11.10 10.49 8.96 8.37 7.63 6.76 5.81 4.21
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Figure 4.7: Figure showing the sensitivity of Within class Hamming distance with
respect to temperatures for different technology SRAMs.
4.3 Per temperature key enrollment and generation system
This section explains the process of key establishment using a temperature sensor
and temperature sensitive PUF. We then explain the importance of error correction
codes and their use with temperature-based PUF keys. The process of key enrollment
and generation with the help of error correction codes is described along with a
detailed description of the system.
4.3.1 Key enrollment
Enrollment is done to generate Helper data from the key and the PUFs that can
be used later by the system to generate the same key. Figure 4.8 shows the system
for performing key enrollment. Enrollment of keys will be done for each temperature
step in our case to generate a per temperature (T) key denoted by KT . We use a
BCH encoder having a block size of n-bit, message input of k-bit and t number of
correctable errors. To generate a K-bit key, we have to divide it into blocks of k bits.
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Figure 4.8: Per-temperature one time key enrollment
For each block i of k-bit input, a n-bit output codeword CT,i is generated by the BCH
encoder. This codeword is then offset by the response of the PUF RT,i at the same
temperature T which generates n-bit helper data HT,i. This helper data will be used
later by the system to generate the key for that temperature. The enrollment process
will be performed for the whole operating temperature range of the system.
4.3.2 Key generation
Figure 4.9 shows the system used to generate the key on a per-temperature basis.
To generate the key, the temperature is read from the temperature sensor and is used
to read out the correct helper data HT,i from the memory. This helper data gets offset
by the n-bit PUF response R′T,i. The response of the PUF is noisy and tends to change
over evaluations. The response used to offset the helper data may be different than
the response RT,i used during enrollment. This will produce a corrupted codeword
C ′T,i. The k-bits of the key can be recovered from the invalid codeword as long as
the number of errors in the response is under the correctable errors t of the BCH
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Figure 4.9: Per-temperature key generation
code used. At the output of the BCH decoder, we will get the enrolled key for that
temperature if the previous condition is satisfied.
4.3.3 Complete system
The complete system example is shown in figure 4.10. When the master node
requests communication with slave node, the slave node generates the key based
on its ambient temperature. The key is generated using the scheme proposed in
the previous section. The slave node sends its first message, containing information
already known to the master, encrypted with the key generated at temperature T
along with its ambient temperature to establish a secure communication line. The
master node knows the keys for the slave node at each enrolled temperatures. Using
the temperature reported by the slave node, the master node can use the key for that
temperature to decrypt the message packet. In the case of failure in decryption of
the message, the master node will be able to detect that the reported temperature
was fake and the node has been tampered with. Thus, the key will serve as a proof
of temperature.
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Figure 4.10: Complete system
4.4 Conclusion
We have shown the feasibility of using the SRAM PUFs for temperature based
key establishment. We have shown the results across various technologies of SRAMs.
We have also proposed a system for error correction and key generation based on
temperature. Future work will include investigating schemes to narrow down the bits
of SRAM that can be used to distinguish temperature and reduce the response size
needed for the SRAM.
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CHAPTER 5
ALTERNATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANDERSON’S
PUF ON XILINX FPGA
FPGAs are used for an increasingly large number of applications which require
security. Due to their volatile nature, SRAM-based FPGAs require security at multi-
ple levels. Bitstream encryption is often used to protect the configuration bits which
define application implementation. Additionally, secure encrypt/decrypt cores are
often implemented as part of a user’s design to allow for the confidential processing
of application data. These cores require secret keys that are often customized on a
per-device basis.
In this section, we discuss the implementation of Anderson’s PUF on SLICEL cells
on FPGAs. The goal of this implementation is to allow the placement of encryption
and key generation block on a fixed footprint on the FPGA. Also, for this PUF we
will utilise per-device selection of PUFs on the block to reduce the size of the error
correction circuitry on the FPGA. This work is a continuation of work done in [42].
5.1 Motivation
In this section we discuss the motivation behind this work. There were two primary
reasons for the development of an alternate architecture. The first reason being the
tuning of Hamming weight of PUF response and second being the resource constraint.
We will discuss them in detail in the following sections.
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Figure 5.1: Figure showing the effect of elongating the carry chain on SLICEM
based PUF’s response.
5.1.1 Discrete stages for tune-ability
As discussed in section , the width of the glitch used to trigger the asynchronous
set of the flip-flop depends on the number of stages in the carry chain. We can
only change the number of stages in discrete steps. A problem arises when a device
produce a balanced number of 0 and 1 responses for any length of carry chain. For
Virtex-7 FPGAs we performed experiments to see the variation of Hamming weight
with different number of stages. As is clear from fig. 5.1 there is no number of stages
that balances the Hamming weight of the PUF response for the device.
With the absence of a point that balances the PUF response, the uniqueness of
the PUF would be reduced thereby rendering it ineffective for key generation.
5.1.2 Design resource requirement
The design as originally proposed by Anderson can only be implemented on
SLICEMs which are rare and fewer in number. The shift registers are used from
SLICEM cells to ensure synchronous triggering of the Multiplexer select lines. This
limits the placement of the PUFs on the device and also use up these limited resources
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Figure 5.2: Figure showing the effect of adding Multiplexer stages in the chain. The
glitch get filtered out, thereby narrowing it down and reducing the probability of
setting the Flip-Flop.
Figure 5.3: Figure showing variation of Hamming weight with change in delay
difference between two paths for a carry chain of length 2.
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which may be required for design purposes. The chip Xilinx Zynq-7020 contains
53,200 SLICEL cells and 17,400 SLICEM cells. We can clearly see that SLICEL cells
are about 3 times the number of SLICEM cells in the chip. The original Anderson’s
PUF require the SLICEM cells. On the chip Xilinx Zynq-7020, there are 53,200 SLI-
CEL cells and 17,400 SLICEM cells. We can clearly see that SLICEL cells are about
3 times the number of SLICEM cells in the chip. Therefore the block selected may
not have adequate SLICEM cells to implement the PUF based key generation block.
5.2 The SLICEL PUF implementation and characterization
The novel implementation of Anderson’s PUF that is proposed this study is shown
in Fig. 5.4. It consists of two Xilinx SLICEs which can be either SLICEMs or
SLICELs. We focus on SLICELs because previous works cannot make use of these.
Relative to Anderson’s PUF, our design replaces the shift register in each SLICEM
with synchronous toggling signals created in each SLICEL from a flip-flop and a LUT
configured as an inverter.
The timing operation of the design is shown in Fig. 5.5 and described here. Flip-
flop FF1 in SLICE2 is initialized to a logic-1 and the corresponding flip-flop FF1
in SLICE1 is initialized to a logic-0. These flip flops will toggle their value in each
cycle. A race condition that occurs after every second rising clock edge determines
the width of the pulse that gets generated. The racing signals are as follows:
• On the clock edge, a rising transition propagates in SLICE2 from signal Q2 at
the output of FF1 to signal S2 at the select input of multiplexer M1. The
rising transition arrives when the 1-selected input of the multiplexer holds a
logic-1 value, and causes the output of M1 to rise.
• On the same clock edge that triggered the above described sequence, in SLICE1
a falling transition propagates from signal Q1 at the output of FF1 to signal S1
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at the select input of multiplexer M1 and then propagates upward through the
delay chain. When this falling transition reaches the 1-selected input of M1 in
SLICE2 it causes the output of the multiplexer to fall, terminating the pulse.
According to the race condition described above, the duration of the pulse as seen
on signal Pulse0 can therefore be described by Eq. 5.1. Here, Wglitch is the duration
of the pulse, Dchain is the delay through the length of the carry chain, DQ1−S1 is the
delay from Q1 to signal S1 in SLICE1, and DQ2−S2 is the delay from Q2 to signal
S2 in SLICE2.
Wglitch = Dchain +DQ1−S1 −DQ2−S2 (5.1)
As shown in Fig. 5.4, the pulse on signal pulse0 can be propagated through three
additional multiplexers in SLICE2, and this gives designers a choice about which
pulse signal should be attached to the asynchronous preset signal of the flip-flop that
will capture the PUF response. In the figure we have shown that pulse0 is the one
attached to the flip-flop, but we will show in the next subsection how the choice among
these pulses can be exploited to tune the Hamming weight of the PUF responses.
To optimize the PUF quality, we can use extra stages of multiplexer at the top of
the selected carry chain to control the width of the glitch. Figure 5.2 shows the effect
of adding extra multiplexer stages at the top of the carry chain. From the result we
can see that adding 1 filter stage gives a Hamming weight close to the ideal value of
50%.
5.2.1 PUF Hamming weight tuning
To maximize the uniqueness of PUF responses, it is desirable to have the average
Hamming weight of PUFs be close to 50%. In the Anderson PUF and our varia-
tion thereof, the average Hamming weight of the PUF response bits depends on the
expected width of the glitch that arrives at the asynchronous preset input of the
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Figure 5.4: The alternate implementation of Anderson’s PUF [3] implemented on a
Virtex 7 architecture. The two LUTs are separated vertically by three Multiplexer
stages and feed their corresponding flip-flops to generate a toggle signal for the
select lines of their corresponding Muxes.
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Figure 5.5: The timing waveforms shown govern the operation of glitch generation
and glitch filtering in SLICEL PUF.
capturing flip-flop. A short glitch is less prone to setting the flip-flop value high,
while a long glitch enhances the chance that the flip-flop will be triggered to store a
response value of 1. Ideally, the average pulse pulse width will be on the cusp of the
two response values, such that the response of each PUF instance will be caused by
its process variations and their effect on the pulses of that PUF instance. We explore
three different knobs that can be used to control the average Hamming weight of the
PUF response bits.
Tuning by varying the chain length: Changing the number of delay stages
in the design can be used adjust the term Dchain in Eq. 5.1, which describes the
propagation time for a signal to propagate through the delay chain. As described by
Eq. 5.1, changing this term has a direct impact on the glitch width, and therefore can
be used to tune the Hamming weight of a design. The effect of changing the length
is shown in figure 5.1. A longer delay chain increases the response Hamming weight.
Tuning by addition of filter stages: The second tuning parameter is the
number of filtering stages used between the pulse generation and the preset input
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of the flip-flop that generates the PUF response. To optimize the PUF response
Hamming weight, we can use extra stages of the multiplexer at the top of the selected
carry chain to control the width of the pulse. The addition of these filter stages
attenuates the pulse before it reaches the preset of the Flip-Flop. Figure 5.2 shows
the effect of adding extra multiplexer stages as filters. From the result, we can see
that adding 1 filter stage gives a Hamming weight close to the ideal value of 50%
when the delay chain comprises three multiplexers. Regardless of the delay chain
length, adding more filter stages is found to reduce the Hamming weight.
Tuning by adjusting path delays: The third parameter to tune the Hamming
weight of the PUF response can be done by varying the delay difference of the two
paths that connect the output of the Flip-Flop to the input of the LUT. These delays
are marked as DQ1−S1 and DQ2−S2 in figure 5.5. We can see that the these 2 delays
affect how wide the glitch (shown as Wglitch) produced would be. Any increase in
delay DQ2−S2 will delay the start of the pulse and thereby cause a corresponding
reduction in glitch width. This effect of varying the delay difference is shown in
figure 5.3. There is variation in Hamming weight of the response with the delay
difference between these two paths.
To tune the path delays and change the 0-1 balance we begin with a PUF config-
uration having mux chain of length 2 with no filter stages. Random unconstrained
routing is then performed on the feedback paths of the PUF by the Xilinx Vivado
routing tool. Statistics are generated from the data acquired by evaluating the PUFs
responses generated from the unconstrained routing to find what delay difference be-
tween the feedback routes produces the best balance in Hamming weight. The value
of the delay difference that has the probability closest to 50 % for producing a one
and a zero as the response is chosen as the desired value. In case of length 2 PUFs
with no filter stages, we can see that a delay difference between -25ps and -75ps gives
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the best balance (close to 50%). Once this value is known, we perform the following
steps:
• For one PUF in placed in a block, we try different values on minimum delay
constraints, in steps of 10ps, on each of the two feedback routes from the output
of Flip-Flop to the input of LUT. This forces the routing tool to a find paths
from the flip-flop to the LUT with a variety of different propagation delays.
• For each value of minimum delay, we record the obtained value after routing
to generate a list of attainable delays and the specific routes that have these
delays.
• From the two lists of delay values, one for each feedback path, we pick the values
that produce the desired delay difference value which balances the response of
the PUF.
This process is repeated one time for each PUF that resides in a different block
because it has a different set of resources in the SLICE. The values generated are
then used to generate proper delay and balance the response Hamming weight.
Our design uses a carry chain of length 3 with 1 filter stage and matched feedback
paths. All the results presented hereafter in the paper will be with respect to this
tuning.
5.2.2 PUF reliability & uniqueness
Reliability and uniqueness are the most important properties of a weak PUF.
Reliability refers to the repeatability of PUF outputs over time, which lessens the
burden of error correction. Uniqueness is a measure of how different the output
values are across PUF instances. We quantify these two properties for the Virtex 7
architecture by analyzing the Hamming distances between pairings of 128-bit PUFs
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across ten chip instances. In total, we implement the 33 disjoint 128-bit PUFs on
each chip and record 1000 output trials from each.
For reliability, we consider the distribution of within-class Hamming distances.
Within-class Hamming distances are between outputs of two different trials from the
same 128-bit PUF on the same chip. The histogram of Fig. 5.6a shows the distribution
of Hamming distances for 63 million comparisons, representing all combinations of
the 1000 trials that collected for each of the 33 different 128-bit PUFs on each of the
10 chips. The mean within-class distance is 4.0264 bits (3.14%).
To study uniqueness we consider two different variants of between-class Hamming
distance in our analysis. The first is the Hamming distance between outputs from
two different randomly selected 128-bit PUFs that are on different chips or different
locations on the same chip. Over 2.3 billion comparisons the mean distance is found
to be 63.25 bits (49.41%) (Fig. 5.6b). The second set of between-class distances are
similar to the first but confined to only compare PUF pairings that occupy the same
locations on different chips; this case is interesting because it could show a reduced
Hamming distance if PUF output values were significantly influenced by deterministic
bias instead of device-specific process variations. Fig. 5.6c shows that, based on 660
million comparisons, the mean distance is found to be 63.12 bits (49.31%). The
between-class results indicate that the PUFs produce highly unique outputs, and that
the outputs are not being caused by deterministic bias associated with the location
of the PUF on the chip.
5.2.3 Spatial Autocorrelation of PUF Location BERs
It is important to consider whether the PUF BERs are correlated spatially within
each chip, as spatial correlation could imply a common cause for unreliability, instead
of random per-device variations. The heatmap of Fig. 5.8 shows, for a single chip, the
reliability of 4250 PUF instances according to their locations on the chip. Informally,
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Figure 5.6: Histograms of between-class and within-class Hamming distances of 128-
bit PUFs. Within-class distances compare two measurements from the same 128-bit
PUF instance. Between-class distances compare (in b) two different 128-bit PUFs on
the same chip, or (in c) compare 128-bit PUFs that occupy the same locations on
different chips. All measurements were made at room temperature of approximately
24o and at the nominal supply voltage.
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the lack of a clear pattern in this figure gives some visual indication that the unreliable
PUFs are likely to be random and not highly clustered. To formalize the apparent
lack of spatial correlation in Fig. 5.8a, we use Moran’s I as a metric to quantify the
spatial autocorrelation in the BER of PUF instances. For any single chip instance,
Moran’s I is computed using Eq. 5.3, where Bi and B¯ are the BER of PUF instance i
and the mean BER of the chip respectively. Computing Moran’s I requires a spatial
weight wij to indicate which PUF locations should be considered local to each other.
For PUF locations i and j, we compute the weight wij as shown in Eq. 5.2, where
ri and ci are row and column indices of the i
th PUF location. Restating this, the
weight is set to 1 if the Euclidean distance between the row and column indices of
two PUF locations is less than 10. Moran’s I can take values between -1 and 1, where
1 indicates high spatial autocorrelation, and 0 indicates no spatial autocorrelation.
The values of I obtained for all of the 10 chips are between 0.013 and 0.017, indicating
that the unreliable PUFs do not tend to be highly clustered. An implication of the
random position of unreliable PUFs is that it is not possible to simply choose certain
positions for PUF placement that will be reliable across all chips.
wij =

1 if
√
(ri − rj)2 + (ci − cj)2 < 10
0 otherwise
(5.2)
I =
N∑
i
∑
j wij
∑
i
∑
j wij(Bi − B¯)(Bj − B¯)∑
i(Bi − B¯)2
(5.3)
5.3 Per-Device selection of PUFs
Given that our chosen design uses a delay path with 3 multiplexers and 1 stage of
glitch filters to achieve a Hamming weight close to 50% (see Fig. 5.2), there are two
options for placing the design in a pair of SLICEs. Fig. 5.7 shows the two possible
configurations. The first two lines of Tab. 5.1 shows the between-class and within-class
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Table 5.1: Mean Hamming distance comparisons from 10 chips
Configuration Within class Between class
1 3.14% 49.31%
2 3.07% 46.09%
Hamming distances for each of these configurations. The low within-class Hamming
distance shows good reliability in both configurations, and the close-to-ideal between-
class Hamming distances show good uniqueness. This implies that two SLICEs can
be configured in two different ways as a PUF, and in either configuration will have
similarly desirable PUF statistics.
The average reliabilities of 3.14 and 3.07 are aggregated over many different PUFs
with heterogeneous BERs. In reality, there are many PUF instances that are ex-
tremely reliable, and some that are very unreliable. At a single location of two slices,
we will show it is often the case that one PUF configuration will be unreliable and the
other will be reliable. Because of this, it is possible to create a highly reliable PUF
by choosing the more reliable configuration in each of the PUF locations, but the
choice must be made uniquely for each chip. The only scenario in which per-device
configuration will not be beneficial is if both configurations for a given PUF bit are
equally unreliable.
The benefit of performing best configuration selection is shown in table 5.1. The
data is generated by taking the average of responses from 10 different chips. We can
clearly see that the BER (within class Hamming distance) has gone down significantly
without effecting the uniqueness of the PUF (between-class Hamming distance). This
is also shown in figure 5.9. We can see that the fraction of reliable PUFs has increased.
Reducing the BER of the PUFs has a great impact on the overall system cost in temrs
area and power once error correction is considered.
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(a) configuration 1 (b) configuration 2
Figure 5.7: Two possible PUF configurations within the cell
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(a) Heatmap of BERs of PUFs in configuration 1
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(b) Heatmap of BERs of PUFs in configuration 2
Figure 5.8: Figure shows the BER of PUF instances placed at different locations on
a chip. Unreliable instances are scattered and not concentrated in a particular area
of the chip and uncorrelated across configurations.
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Figure 5.9: Figure showing the distribution of a 1 response of the PUF across 10
chips. A high probability closer to 0 or 100 percent implies that PUFs are highly
reliable. Broken line indicates points where the value is zero.
5.3.1 Correlation of between-configuration PUF responses
Either of the PUF configurations shown in Fig. 5.7 can be used in any two
SLICELs, and as discussed in Sec. 5.3 we exploit this choice in order to choose the
specific configuration that is found to be most reliable for each PUF location on a
given chip. Noting that the two configurations share in common much of the delay
chain, it is reasonable to wonder whether the two configurations would tend have
similar reliabilities, which would eliminate the benefits of per-device configuration.
Our findings in Fig. 5.10a show the BERs of the two different configurations do not
tend to be correlated; if one configuration happens to have a high-BER PUF, it is
not the case that the other configuration would also have a high-BER PUF.
In fact, despite the two configurations sharing a number of delay stages, the re-
sponses of the two configurations are relatively unique to each other, as shown in
Fig. 5.10b. The fractional Hamming distance in this case is 38.02-bits (29.71%),
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(a) BER in two different configurations
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Figure 5.10: When the same logic slices are configured in two different ways
(see Fig. 5.7) on the same chips: (a) their BERs are uncorrelated; and (b) the frac-
tional Hamming distance between responses from each configuration is 38.02-bits
(29.71%).
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which is less than ideal, but roughly ten times higher than the within-class distances.
The uniqueness of the responses implies a large variation in the pulse widths gener-
ated in each configuration. Given that the width of each pulse is described by Eq
5.1, the finding implies that most the variability in the pulse width is coming from
the random delay differences between the logically identical feedback paths that are
unique to each configuration, and not due to the variations in the delay chain that
are common to both configurations.
5.3.2 Design flow for per-device PUF configuration
Although selection of PUF configurations will require some amount of work to be
done for each chip, it is infeasible for the entire design to be modified for each chip.
We propose a CAD flow in which a global design is created that contains PUFs, and
this design is then customized with a chip-specific partial bitstream that customizes
its PUF configurations without going through the full place-and-route. The procedure
uses the steps as described below:
• When performing place and route of the overall design, represent each PUF
with a placeholder that uses the union of configuration 1 and configuration 2
resources. Later, for each instance, the placeholder will be replaced by a PUF
in one configuration or the other.
• Create a bitstream that instantiates configuration-1 PUFs at each PUF location,
along with testbench logic to collect many responses from each PUF instance
and communicate back the results. Create a similar bitstream for configuration-
2 PUFs.
• To deploy the PUF-containing design on a chip instance, do the following:
– Apply the configuration-1 bitstream and collect results
– Apply the configuration-2 bitstream and collect results
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– For each PUF location, decide whether configuration 1 or configuration 2
has a lower BER.
– Customize the design bitstream by replacing the PUF placeholders with
the specific choice of which PUFs to implement on that chip.
5.3.3 Temperature dependence of PUF response
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Figure 5.11: Effect of temperature on reliability of PUF(4250-bit) before best PUF
configurations selection
In this section, we study the reliability of the proposed design with respect to
temperature. The data was collected by putting the whole board in a TestEquity
115A Temperature Chamber. The soak time for each temperature was 10 minutes.
After the soak, 1000 trials were collected from the chip and process was repeated
for each temperature. Lastly, the on chip temperature sensor was used to verify the
temperature after the soak time. The 10 degree Celsius trials were considered as the
enrolled responses and comparisons were made with other temperature responses to
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Figure 5.12: Effect of temperature on reliability of PUF(4250-bit) after best PUF
configuration selection
see the variation in within class hamming distance with temperature. Fig. 5.11 shows
the plot for five temperatures from 10◦C to 50◦C in steps of 10◦C. Table 5.2 shows
the average of BER for each of the five temperatures. The change in temperature
causes an increase in the between-temperature Hamming distance, especially at higher
temperatures.
We can increase the reliability of the design by selecting the best of PUFs on a chip
from the two configurations. We select the best PUFs configuration for each PUF by
generating a response at 20◦C. The selection is made on the basis of BER of that PUF.
The selected configuration for each PUF is implemented and then evaluated at all the
temperatures from 10◦C to 50◦C. The data for reliability for the two configurations
and after selection of best configuration is tabulated in Table 5.2 and plotted in
Fig. 5.12. Even though the choice of which configuration to use is made based on
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Table 5.2: Within class Hamming distance of PUFs (4250-bit) under different config-
urations at different temperatures
Temp(◦C) 10 20 30 40 50
1 3.00% 3.26% 3.96% 5.04% 6.45%
2 2.86% 3.16% 3.94% 5.08% 6.60%
Best 0.39% 0.40% 0.53% 0.90% 1.80%
room temperature measurements, these PUFs are found to be more reliable across a
range of temperatures.
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CHAPTER 6
PUF BASED KEY GENERATION ON FPGAS
Keys used for cryptographic purposes must be repeatable to provide encryption
and decryption of messages without error and to establish authenticity. To generate
keys that are unique to each device we use PUFs. PUFs responses are noisy and tend
to change over evaluations. This is not desireable as it can cause errors in key. To cope
with this problem, fuzzy extractor [1][20][47] are used which uses a key along with the
PUF data to generate a helper data. The helper data can be used later by the system
during runtime to generate the key even with noisy PUF response. The key can be
recovered as long as the PUF response error is within the correctable range of errors
of the fuzzy extractor. We use a code-offset fuzzy extractor [1] construction with BCH
codes for error correction in this work. In BCH codes, each code is described by a
tuple (n,k,t); parameter n is the block size, parameter k is the number of information
bits, and parameter t is the number of correctable errors.
Figure 6.1 shows the enrollment process of the key generated from the PUF. To
generate a K-bit key using a BCH(n,k,t) with n-bits of output, k-bits of input data
and t correctable errors, we have to split the K-bits of key into blocks of k-bits. For
each block of the key, a n-bit codeword Ci is produced by the BCH encoder which
gets offset by a n-bit PUF block Ri. This generates the n-bit helper data Hi for each
k-bit blocks of the key. This helper data is then stored in the system to generate the
key at a later time.
Figure 6.2 shows the key generation process. The Helper data Hi is prestored in
the system and is used to generate the key. The PUF blocks are evaluated, which
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Figure 6.1: Block diagram showing the one time enrollment process for key generation
Figure 6.2: Block diagram showing the one time enrollment process for key generation
produce a response R′i and offsets the corresponding helper data block Hi. The PUF
output generated may slightly differ from the response Ri used during enrollment.
The result is an invalid codeword Ci which is offset by the error bits in the PUF
response. This invalid codeword can still be used to produce the original k-bit block
of key as long as the number of errors in the PUF response were under t-bits. Thus
the whole key can be generated as long as the PUF error doesn’t exceed the maximum
correctable errors of the BCH decoder.
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6.1 Cost of Error correction
The cost of correcting the errors increases with the number of correctable errors.
For the BCH decoder of block size n-bit, as the number of correctable errors t in-
creases, the number of data bits k decreases. This results in an increase in the number
of PUFs needed to offset the BCH encoded codewords. The complexity of the BCH
decoder itself also increases. This results in a penalty in both area and power on the
chip. For example, for a 255-bit block size, there can be two different codes used.
One could correct 7 errors and carry 199 information bits while another could carry
only 123 information bits but correct up to 18 errors. So, a 256-bit key generated
from the above two codes would require 2 and 3 blocks respectively.
In traditional analysis, the bit error rate pbit is calculated by averaging the error
rates of all the PUFs and using it to generate the block failure rate. The probability
of incorrectly decoding a block as pblock. This is computed using Equation 6.1 which
shows the probability of finding more than t erroneous bits among n codeword bits
when the bit error rate is pbit. The probability of generating an invalid 128-bit key is
denoted by pkey and denoted by Equation 6.2.
pblock =
n∑
i=t+1
 n
i
 pibit(1− pbit)n−i (6.1)
pkey = 1− (1− pblock)[128/k] (6.2)
This analysis ignores that not all the PUFs are homogenous and using an average
bit error can result in an incorrect approximation of error. This would lead to a
wastage in the area resulting from the increased size of error correcting circuitry.
6.2 A statistical model for PUF error correction
As discussed in previous section, the traditional model uses an average value of the
BER to decide the size of error correcting code. This can be an under approximation
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is there are some highly reliable PUFs or an over approximation if there are some
highly unreliable PUFs. Both the cases are undesirable as the former will cause key
failures and the latter will waste area and power on the chip. To cope with this
problem, an accurate model that closely fits the statistics of a PUF is required to
better predict the number of errors to be corrected [27].
6.2.1 Two parameter model
The response of the PUF is dependent upon two factors. The first one is the pro-
cess variation in the silicon during manufacturing and the second one being the noise
present at the time of response evaluation. A probabilistic PUF model is developed in
[27] which takes into consideration the behavior of each individual PUF. It considers
the probability of error for each individual PUF.
For the PUF i, the following variables are the observable variables:
• The One-probability(pi) of a PUF instance i is the probability that the response
of the PUF is a ’1’upon an evaluation.
• The Error-probability(pe,i) of a cell producing a response different from the one
generated at enrollment (golden response).
The PUF response characteristics are modelled using the following hdden vari-
ables:
1. Manufacturing process variation(mi): This variable quantifies the amount of
variation from the ideal design value and is determined once after the fabrication
of the PUF and can be assumed to be constant throughout the lifetime of the
PUF.
2. Noise variable(nni ): This variable quantifies the amount of noise that effects the
response of the PUF at a every evaluation. The noise variable re-sampled at
every evaluation of the PUF instance.
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6.2.2 PUF model generation
To begin the modelling of the PUF behavior we first calculate the cumulative
distribution function for one probability of the PUF response. Equation 6.3 [27] a is
used to represent the one probability cumulative distribution function.
cdfp(x) = φ(λ1φ
−1(x) + λ2) (6.3)
Here, λ1 = σN/σM and λ2 = (t − µM)/σM . σN and σM are standard deviations
in process variation and noise variables respectively and µM and µN are means of
the process variation and noise variables respectively. t is the threshold parameter
which determines the response of the PUF. If the combined effect of noise and process
variable is greater than t, the response will be a 1, otherwise the response will be a 0.
We use curve fitting tool in MATLAB to perform non-linear fit over variables
(λ1, λ2) to minimize the mean square error of Equation 6.3 and the actual PUF data
generated from the chip. A fit for configuration 1 PUFs is obtained at λ1 = 0.0711
and λ2 = 0.1834. Figure 6.3 shows that the model yields a close fit to the PUF
statistics. We do the fitting for both the configurations and after performing best
PUF selection.
By using the values of λ1 and λ2 in Equation 6.3, a one probability distribution
can be obtained. This distribution can be used to generate generate PUF bit errors
that actually resemble the values acquired from the chip.
pdfpe(x) = λ1(1− x)ϕ(λ1φ
−1 + λ2) + ϕ(λ1φ−1(x)− λ2
ϕ(φ−1(x))
(6.4)
Equation 6.4 [27] gives the probability distribution function of the error proba-
bilities where ϕ(x) and φ−1(x) refer to the probability density function of a normal
distribution and the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of a normal dis-
tribution. To analyze the failure rates, we take 1000 samples of this distribution for
values of x starting from 0 to 0.999 in steps of 0.001.
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Figure 6.3: Fitted model vs actual data obtained at λ1 = 0.0711 and λ2 = 0.1834 for
configuration 1
The key failure rate distribution is calculated for different error correcting codes.
To calculate the block failure rate, we use the error probability model developed
above. We use equation 6.5 to calculate the key failure rate. Here, n is the number
of blocks of puf used to generate the key.
pfail = 1− (1− pblockfail)n (6.5)
Probability of block failure is calculated using equation 6.6 [27]. In this equation, n is
the number of pufs and t is the number of correctable errors. FPB(t; p
n
e ) is a Poisson
binomial distribution for the error rates of PUF and is given by 6.7. Instead of using
fixed error rate, this distribution is used to generate more realistic block failure rates.
Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 show the failure rate distribution for both the configurations
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Figure 6.4: Key failure distribution with different number of error correcting BCH
code for Configuration 1
and after selection of best configuration.
pblockfail(p
n
e) = 1− FPB(t; pne) (6.6)
FPB(t; p
n
e ) =
t+ 1
n+ 1
+
1
n+ 1
n∑
i=1
1− C−i(t+1)
1− C−i
n∏
k=1
(pe,kC
i + (1− pe,k)) (6.7)
C = e
j2pi
n+1 (6.8)
6.3 Results
We evaluate the error correcting needed to generate a key having maximum block
failure rate of 10−6 for 99% of the chips using the PUF model created in section 6.2.1.
In case of PUFs taken from the two configurations independently, from the data
taken from 10 chips, the code needed to ensure the security metric described above is
BCH(127,8,31). After performing the per-device selection of best PUFs from the two
configurations we can go down to BCH(127,50,13) after evaluating PUF data from
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Figure 6.5: Key failure distribution with different number of error correcting BCH
code for Configuration 2
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Table 6.1: Resource requirements for 128-bit key generation
Mode
BCH code
(n,k,t)
BCH Decoder PUF Total Savings%
LUTs FFs LUTs FFs LUTs FFs LUTs FFs
Best 127,50,13 1381 1088 762 1143 2143 2231
69% 72%
Normal 127,8,31 2904 1888 4064 6096 6968 7984
10 chips. This clearly indicates that after performing best configuration selection the
size of error correcting code circuitry has gone down significantly. Table 6.1 lists the
different BCH codes and their resource requirements for implementation on a Xilinx
Zynq-7020 chip. The area saving can be computed by comparing the requirements for
the two cases. The total area savings are about 69% for LUTs and 72% for flip-flops.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, a scheme for temperature based keys using SRAM PUF is evaluated.
SRAMs fabricated in different technologies have been evaluated and it is seen that this
scheme is valid for all of them. We have shown that we can distinguish temperatures
using PUFs. The resolution of temperature is dependent on the number of bits.
The more the number of PUFs we have, the finer temperature difference we can
distinguish.
A novel implementation of Anderson’s PUF is developed for Xilinx FPGAs that
can be instantiated anywhere on the chip. A scheme for increasing the PUF reliability
using selection between PUF configurations is also shown. The effectiveness of the
scheme is shown by calculating the error correcting code needed for a specified key
failure rate using a statistical PUF model. It is evident from the results that there is
a significant reduction in the area required by the error correcting code after doing
per device selection of best PUFs.
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